Abstract-When the basic functionalities of a wireless mobile network have been achieved, customers are then more interested in value-added mobile applications. In order to attract more customers to such mobile applications, a solid, secure and robust trading model is a must. This paper proposes such a secure trading model named Mobile Electronic Payment (MEP) for wireless mobile networks, which applies the emerging ID-based cryptography for key agreement and authentication. Our MEP attempts to alleviate the computational cost, reduce the memory space requirement in mobile devices, and meet the requirements for secure trading: avoidance of overspending and double spending, fairness, user anonymity and privacy. Our design is transparent to the bearer networks and is of low deployment cost. We expect that our MEP provides a viable trading architecture model for the future mobile applications.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the vast development and deployment of wireless mobile networks such as 3G UMTS [13] , [22] , WiMAX [18] and Wi-Fi [17] , mobile networking applications enabling customers to gain network access anywhere and anytime have attracted more and more attention in our daily lives. When the basic functionalities of a wireless network have been in place, customers are now more interested in valueadded mobile applications over this network. Most mobile applications come with the emergence of electronic trading (mobile commerce or m-commerce), hence good secure mobile trading model must be designed to attract more mobile users for doing business wirelessly. Thus, how to integrate the mobile applications with a secure trading model becomes an important design issue, which will significantly affect the success of any value-added mobile application. This is the major topic of this paper. Mobile applications can be categorized into session-based applications and event-based applications. In event-based applications, user's payment is reflected by one-time events. Examples include sending a message, querying traffic information, or purchasing a song. A session-based application consists of three phases: the session-setup phase, the communication phase and the session release phase. A customer is charged for a session-based application based on either time spent or data volume transferred, e.g., VoIP-calling, videostreaming, audio-streaming, or video-conferencing.
There are a few payment models proposed in the literature [2] , [21] , which can be classified into two categories: the traditional payment model and the micropayment model. The examples of traditional payment models include the credit card platforms [5] , [1] , [24] , [23] and the electronic cash platforms [6] , [25] , [8] . The traditional payment models allow only one payment in a payment transaction, which has been widely adopted for the event-based applications. Since a sessionbased application usually requires multiple payments during the execution of this application, with the traditional payment model, it requires multiple payment transactions to complete a session-based application. This is inefficient because heavy signaling and computational overheads are introduced into the network. On the other hand, the micropayment models allow multiple payments in a payment transaction, which is considered more efficient than the traditional payment model. Thus, the micropayment models [32] , [14] , [31] , [27] are often adopted for most of mobile applications. To secure transactions, in [32] , [27] , the public-key cryptography (e.g., RSA [19] ) is adopted. Unfortunately, the public-key cryptography requires heavy computation and long execution time, which may not be a good solution in wireless mobile networks. Yang et al. [31] applied the symmetric-key cryptography 1 such as Advnaced Encryption Standard (AES) [9] that is more efficient than the public-key cryptography in terms of computational cost and is more suitable for mobile devices. Unfortunately, the symmetric-key cryptography requires more frequent key establishments and updates to prevent the shared key from being compromised, and hence induces more communication cost due to key establishment and key updates. Moreover, how to establish the shared key in wireless mobile networks for the 1 The sender and receiver for a message delivery use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the message and the shared key is known as a symmetric key. symmetric-key cryptography is very challenging.
Compared with fixed networks, mobile networks have lower bandwidth, longer transmission latency, and more unreliable connections, and mobile devices are restricted by limited memory size and low CPU computational capability [20] . The installation of mobile applications on a mobile network should be quick and of low cost. To summarize, the following requirements should be addressed when designing a suitable trading mechanism on a mobile network. First, customers expect a robust, secure, and fair trading mechanism which can be applied in different mobile networks. Second, the trading mechanism should be light-weight (i.e., with low computational complexity and low communication overhead) so that it can be easily run on mobile devices. Third, user anonymity should be achieved, that is, users' purchasing behavior or preference should not be traceable by others. Finally, a trading mechanism should be of low implementation cost.
In this paper, we design an application-level secure payment model, named Mobile Electronic Payment (MEP), for wireless mobile networks, which attempts to meet these requirements. It is based on a more general trading architecture model (cf. Section II-A), which combines both public-key cryptography and symmetric-key cryptography to overcome the disadvantages of both technologies. Specifically, we apply the emerging ID-Based Cryptography (IBC [7] ; cf. Section II-B) in the MEP to generate the public-private key pairs so that the certificate overheads among the network operator (denoted as O), the user (denoted as U), and the mobile application developer or content provider (denoted as P) commonly required in the traditional public-key cryptography can be eliminated. Then, from these public-private key pairs, we generate three symmetric keys k u−o (held by O and U), k o−p (held by O and P), and k u−p (held by U and P) to encrypt and decrypt the signaling messages exchanged among O, U, and P. An important observation is that these three symmetric keys are established without actually exchanging them among the concerned parties, a unique feature of ID-based cryptography. To prevent the symmetric keys from being compromised, in each payment transaction, the three public-private key pairs (k pub,o , k pri,o ) held by O, (k pub,p , k pri,p ) held by P, and (k pub,u , k pri,u ) held by U are used to generate the new symmetric keys. Our design keeps the key freshness 2 and thus provides more robust security protection. Moreover, MEP supports both event-based and session-based applications and is suitable for the resource-constrained mobile devices because MEP attempts to alleviate the computational cost and reduce the memory space requirement in mobile devices. We expect that our MEP provides a viable trading model for the future mobile applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly illustrate the general conceptual trading model and the basics of the ID-based cryptography. Section III presents the design of MEP. In Section IV, we elaborate on the features and computational overhead of MEP. Finally, Section V concludes our work. Fig. 1 illustrates the general conceptual trading model for mobile applications [11] , [32] , which consists of three major components: the network operator O (Fig. 1 (1) ), the user (customer) U ( Fig. 1 (2) ), and the mobile applications/content provider P (Fig. 1 (3) ). The Ps supply mobile applications to Us. The O provides network bearer services (e.g., the UMTS bearer services or the WLAN services) to Us, through which Us may use different kinds of mobile devices to access the applications. P and O may reside in different networks. For example, O is the operator of a cellular network, and P resides in the Internet.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. General Conceptual Trading Model
In this trading model, O has to be trusted by U and P. Initially, U and P apply for accounts from O, and O maintains an account balance ( Fig. 1 (4) ) for each account. The publicprivate key pairs, (k pub,o , k pri,o ), (k pub,p , k pri,p ), and (k pub,u , k pri,u ), and certificates, c o , c p , and c u , which are held by O, U, and P, respectively, are used to address the security issues such as the confidentiality and authentication. The certificate is used to verify the owner of a public key. The certificate uses a digital signature to bind a public key with an individual's identity information (e.g., telephone number or email address). The public-private key pairs are used to encrypt and decrypt all the signaling messages exchanged among O, U, and P.
Before U purchases a mobile application from P, it initiates a Payment Transaction among O, P, and U. The creation process of a payment transaction consists of three phases [11] : the Withdrawal phase ( Fig. 1 (5) ), the Payment phase ( Fig. 1  (6) ), and the Deposit phase ( Fig. 1 (7) ). The process begins at the Withdrawal phase where U obtains the electronic means (e.g., the electronic tokens [6] , [25] or the valueadded smart card [10] ) from O. Then, the process enters the Payment phase. In the Payment phase, U issues the electronic means to P, which is known as "payment". Then P checks the validity of the electronic means. If it is valid, U is permitted to purchase a mobile application. The payment may be performed either once or many times, which depends on whether the application is event-based or session-based. For an event-based application, only one payment is made in this phase. For a session-based application, multiple payments may be executed. When the mobile application ends, the process gets into the Deposit phase. In this phase, P uses the electronic means obtained from U to exchange the payment with O, where O verifies the electronic means and deposits the payment into P's account.
B. Basics of the ID-Based Cryptography
This section briefly discusses the fundamentals of the IDbased cryptography (IBC) [7] . The general IBC concept was proposed in [28] in 1984. Only after 2001 when Boneh and Franklin [7] successfully implemented the IBC concept by using the bilinear pairing function does IBC gain more popularity and show many more useful applications of this technique [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] . In IBC, there is no binding between the user ID and public keys. With this future, the proposed MEP adopts IBC to save transactions and cost associated with either communications and computation.
In the IBC, each user owns a key pair (k pub , k pri ). The k pub is a public key, which is derived from a user's identity information (e.g., user's telephone number or email address). The derivation of k pub can be done at the user's device or at the trusted authority (e.g., a network operator). The k pri is a private key, which is generated by the trusted authority by taking the k pub into a function f and is passed to the user through a secure link. As mentioned in [7] , [16] , [37] , the main advantage of the IBC is that there is no need to have certificate to bind user names with their public keys.
III. THE MOBILE ELECTRONIC PAYMENT (MEP) PLATFORM
In this section, we present the MEP platform which follows the general trading model. When a new user U or a mobile application/content provider P joins the MEP, the Key Distribution procedure (to be elaborated later) is executed to distribute U or P public-private key pairs denoted as (k pub,u , k pri,u ) or (k pub,p , k pri,p ), respectively. Then, U can purchase a mobile application from P by running a payment transaction. In a payment transaction, the signaling messages exchanged among O, U, and P are encrypted using three symmetric keys k u−o (held by O and U), k o−p (held by O and P), and k u−p (held by U and P). The three symmetric keys are updated (by utilizing the public-private key pairs) at the beginning of every payment transaction. A payment transaction consists of three phases, the Withdrawal phase (where U obtains te tokens from O), the Payment phase (where U uses the tokes to purchase a mobile application from P), and the Deposit phase (where P redeems the obtained tokens from O).
In the following subsections, we first illustrate the key distribution procedure and then describe how a payment transaction is executed in MEP.
A. The Key Distribution Procedure
The key distribution procedure generates public-private key pairs for O, U and P. The design of this procedure utilizes the IBC to eliminate the certificate overhead from binding one's ID with its public key. Fig. 2 illustrates the message flow for this procedure with the following steps:
Step K1. O first generates a public-params set
by the GENERATE-PARAMS algorithm as shown in Fig. 3 . The public-params set contains all parameters required in MEP. The usage of the parameters is listed in Table I . Then O publishes the generated public-params set in a public place (e.g., website). O selects a random number S ∈ Z * K , and derives its private key k pri,o by computing
where "·" is defined in Property 2 in Section II-B. O keeps S and k pri,o confidential.
Step K2. U sends O the UserAccountRequest message to apply for a user account.
Step K3. Upon receiving U's request, O selects an ID 3 , ID u , for U and creates an account for U. Then O generates U's public key k pub,u and private key k pri,u by
and
O sends k pub,u , k pri,u , and ID u to U through the bearer network link. Since U is the customer of O, the bearer network 4 is considered secure. Steps K4 and K5. The two steps are similar to Steps K2 and K3, respectively. P applies a third-party account by sending the ThirdPartyAccountRequest message to O. O selects an ID, ID p , creates an account for P, and generates P's public key k pub,p and private key k pri,p by
O sends k pub,p , k pri,p , and ID p to P through the secure link between O and P. The cyclic group with operation "+"
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B. Payment Transaction in MEP
In this section, we describe the execution of a payment transaction in MEP for U to purchase a mobile application from P. Following the general trading model, a payment transaction in MEP consists of three phases: the Withdrawal phase, the Payment phase and the Deposit phase, which are described below.
1) Withdrawal Phase:
In this phase, U obtains the electronic means (i.e., the tokens) from O. Fig. 4 illustrates the message flow for this phase with the following steps. To simplify our description, we use k(D) to denote that the data D is encrypted by the symmetric key k with an efficient symmetric-key algorithm.
Step W1. By browsing P's website, U selects a mobile application, gets P's ID, ID p , and obtains the Order Information (OI) containing the ID and the data unit price of the mobile application. Then, U randomly selects an integer R u−o from Z * K and generates the symmetric key k u−o by computing
Then U sends an InitPaymentTrans message to O to initiate a payment transaction, where
contains the necessary information for O to generate the tokens for U. N is the amount of data units U will purchase, and t 1 is the current system time, which is used to prevent message replay and impersonation attacks [26] . 
the sender is illegal, and the phase quits without sending extra messages. If they are equal (i.e., H 1 (ID u ) = k pub,u ), the sender is authenticated and then O checks whether the difference between t 1 and the local clock time is within an acceptance window 5 to prevent from message replay and impersonation [26] . (T N , SN) .
Step W3. Upon receipt of the TokenInfo message, U uses k u−o to decrypt the message and obtains T N and SN . Then, U uses the token root T N to generate N tokens by executing the GENERATE-TOKEN algorithm. Note that due to the lightweight 6 feature of the hash function H 3 [27] , the tokens are generated efficiently.
Step W4. O selects a random integer R o−p from Z * K and generates the symmetric key k o−p as 
Note that from Proposition III-B1, we know
is obtained from the first parameter and k pub,o is obtained from the public-params set) and checks whether the result is equal to the second parameter R o−p · k pub,o carried in the PurchaseInfo message. If they are not equal, the sender is illegal, and the phase quits without sending extra message. If they are equal, the sender is ensured to be O. P checks whether the difference between t 2 and the local clock time is within an acceptance window to prevent from message replay and impersonation. Then, using SN as the index, P stores the information (containing OI, 6 The hash function is about 100 times faster than RSA signature verification, and about 10,000 times faster than RSA signature generation. T 0 , N , and k o−p ) required in the payment phase and the deposit phase into its database. The following result ensures the correctness of our MEP.
Proof:
Similarly, we can prove the other identity.
2) Payment Phase:
In the Payment phase, U uses the tokens to purchase a mobile application from P. This phase may consist of one or more payments. We assume that U pays J i tokens in the ith payment. Fig. 6 illustrates the message flow for the Payment phase with the following steps.
Step P1. U randomly selects an integer R u−p from Z * K and generates the symmetric key k u−p by
where P's public key k pub,p is obtained from k pub,p = H 1 (ID p ). Then U initiates the first payment by sending a InitialPayment message, where
. . T J1 are carried in this message. The parameters of the InitialPayment message include k u−p (SN, T J1 , J 1 ) and R u−p · k pub,u . The second parameter R u−p · k pub,u will be used by P to derive the symmetric key k u−p (see (11) , Step P2). Note that in this step, P cannot directly extract k pub,u easily from the second parameter R u−p · k pub,u , and the InitialPayment message does not contain any information that may leak out U's identity. Therefore, "user anonymity" is well protected.
Step P2. Upon receipt of the InitialPayment message, P uses the second parameter R u−p · k pub,u and P's private key k pri,p to generate the symmetric key k u−p by
From Proposition III-B1, k u−p is the same as k u−p . Using the symmetric key k u−p , P decrypts the first parameter k u−p (SN, T J1 , J 1 ) and obtains SN , T J1 and J 1 . P uses SN as the index to query its database for the token verifier T 0 , N , and OI. According to the mobile application ID contained in OI, P identifies the mobile application that U wants to purchase, and prepares N data units of the mobile application (e.g., streaming data for N seconds). To verify the token T J1 , P checks whether the equation
= T 0 holds. If it holds, P ascertains that the token T J1 is legal. P stores T J1 for verifying the token carried in the next message and discards T 0 to release the memory space. Then P encrypts the first unit to the J 1 th unit of the mobile application using the symmetric key k u−p and responds with the J 1 data units carried in the Delivery message, to U.
Step P3. Upon receipt of the Delivery message, U decrypts the message using the symmetric key k u−p and obtains the J 1 data units. Then, U starts the 2nd Payment to purchase the next J 2 data units by sending P the Payment(T J1+J2 , J 1 + J 2 ) message.
Step P4. Upon receipt of the Payment message, P decrypts the message using the symmetric key k u−p and obtains T J1+J2 and
If the equality holds, P ascertains that the token T J1+J2 is legal. P stores T J1+J2 for verifying the token carried in next message and discards the token T J1 . Then, P encrypts the next J 2 data units of the mobile application using the symmetric key k u−p and delivers the J 2 data units to U. Repeating Steps P3 and P4, U sends the succeeding tokens to P, and P delivers the succeeding data units to U. This phase may be terminated if U stops paying the token or P stops delivering the mobile application.
3) Deposit Phase: Assume that P receives J (J ≤ N ) tokens after the Payment phase. In the Deposit phase, P redeems the J tokens from O. This phase consists of the following two steps.
Step D1. P sends O the deposit message carrying the parameters SN and k o−p (T J , J). 
, O treats the sender of the deposit message as an adversary, and the deposit phase will not carried through. Note that if P does not exercise Step D1 after the payment phase in a predefined time period (e.g., one day), the payment transaction is considered incomplete, and O gives the credit for all tokens into U's account, and terminates the payment transaction.
IV. FEATURES AND OVERHEAD ANALYSIS OF MEP
A. Features of MEP
There are a few useful features of MEP including the avoidance of overspending and double spending, the fairness, the user anonymity, and the privacy, which are discussed next.
1) Avoidance of Overspending and Double Spending: Overspending means that U's account does not have enough credit to purchase a mobile application. Double spending is that U uses the same tokens to purchase mobile applications from different Ps. Both overspending and double spending cause financial loss to O and P. MEP adopts the "prepaid" approach, that is, U's account is deducted (see Step W2 of the withdrawal phase, Section III-B1) before U purchases a mobile application. If U's account does not have enough credit to purchase a mobile application, O will not issue tokens to U. Hence, MEP can avoid the loss due to a user's overspending. Moreover, when U withdraws tokens from O, it has to inform O of P's ID (see Step W1 of the withdrawal phase, Section III-B1). Then, O sends tokens and the corresponding token verifiers to U and P (see Steps W2 and W4 of the withdrawal phase, Section III-B1), respectively. If U applies the same tokens to another P , P will not accept the tokens because it does not own the corresponding token verifiers. Therefore, the risk of double spending is avoided.
2) Fairness: After a payment transaction, U can get the data units of a mobile application, whose value is equivalent to the credits U pays for, and P can get the credits equivalent to the value of data units of the mobile application P provides [30] , which is referred to as the "fairness".
In MEP, during the execution of the payment phase (see Section III-B2), P provides U the data units of the mobile application after U has paid the tokens (i.e., credits). Therefore, there is no risk for P to provide data units. Furthermore, U can terminate the token payment immediately if P does not send the requested data units. In this case, at most one token is lost, which is considered insignificant. The fairness feature can be accommodated in MEP.
3) User Anonymity: The user anonymity is defined in two levels: untraceability and unlinkability [2] . Untraceability means that P is not allowed to know U's identity during the execution of a payment transaction. Unlinkability means that two different payment transactions (which involve the same U) cannot be linked by P, i.e., P is not allowed to identify the two payment transactions initiated by the same U so that any user profiling attempt fails.
In MEP, U and P negotiate only in the payment phase (see Section III-B2) for purchasing mobile applications. The information of U sent to P in this phase contains tokens, the serial number of a payment transaction, the total number of tokens paid to P, and the parameter R u−p · k pub,u , which does not include any U-related information. Through the payment phase, P cannot identify U. Consequently, MEP ensures untraceability. Furthermore, the public key k pub,u of U cannot be extracted from the parameter R u−p · k pub,u , which is shown in Property 2 of a bilinear pairing function in Section II-B. Since P is not able to obtain either U's ID or U's public key, the unlinkability between any two different payment transactions can be achieved in MEP.
4) Privacy: Privacy means that the data of a mobile application exchanged between U and P cannot be revealed by any unauthorized third party except O who distributes the keys. In MEP, the data of a mobile application is encrypted by the symmetric key k u−p , where the k u−p is only known by U and P (see Steps P1 and P2 of the payment phase, Section III-B2). Hence, privacy is well protected in MEP.
B. Computational Overhead of MEP
This section analyzes the computational overhead for a payment transaction in MEP. The computational cost for a payment transaction can be evaluated in the following three aspects.
1) Token Generation and Verification: Let C h3 be the computational cost for executing the H 3 hash function for token generation and verification. Assume that U obtains N tokens from O and pays J (J ≤ N ) tokens to P for a mobile application (i.e., in one payment transaction). O and U generate N tokens by executing the GENERATE-TOKEN algorithm in Steps W2 and W3, respectively, where the hash function H 3 is executed N times with computational cost 2C h3 N . During a payment transaction, P verifies J tokens sent from U in Steps P2 and P4 of the payment phase by executing the H 3 function J times with the computational cost C h3 J. In the deposit phase, P sends the last token of the received J tokens to redeem token from O in Step D1, and O runs the hash function H 3 N − J times to verify the last token (see Step D2), that is, the computational cost is C h3 (N − J). The total computational cost for token verification in a payment transaction is C h3 N . Thus, the total computational cost for token generation and verification is 3C h3 N .
As mentioned in [27] , H 3 is a light-weight function with low computational cost, which is about 100 times faster than the RSA signature verification and about 10, 000 times faster than the RSA signature generation. Usually, the number N of tokens required in a payment transaction is 50 to 50, 000, and the computational cost is 150C h3 to 150, 000C h3 , which is considered to be reasonably smaller than what RSA needs.
2) Message Encryption and Decryption: Let C m be the computational cost of the symmetric key algorithm AES (applied in MEP) for message encryption and decryption. There are three messages (including the InitPaymentTrans, TokenInfo, and PurchaseInfo messages), encrypted in the payment phase. Suppose that there are P (1 ≤ P ≤ N ) payments processed in the payment phase, where P messages (including InitPayment and Payment messages) are encrypted. The deposit message is encrypted in the deposit phase. Each message requires two operations (encryption and decryption). Thus, the total computational cost for message encryption and decryption in MEP is 2(4 + P )C m .
The computational cost of symmetric key cryptography is less complex than public-key cryptography [29] . Our design has the lower computational cost then what is needed than traditional public-key cryptography.
3) Symmetric-Key Update: In MEP, we update three symmetric-keys, k u−o , k o−p , in the withdrawal phase (see Equations (6) , (7), (8) and (9)), and k u−p in the payment phase (see Equations (10) and (11)) by running the H 2 (ê (a · b, c) ) function, where a · b and c are the input parameters, and "·" is the scalar multiplication operation. Let C k be the computational cost of H 2 (ê (a · b, c) ). Computing the H 2 (ê (a · b, c) ) function requires to execute a hash function H 2 , a bilinear pairing functionê and a scalar multiplication. Let C h2 be the computational cost for the hash function H 2 , Cê be the computational cost for the bilinear pairing functionê, C G1 be the computational cost for the scalar multiplication. Then C k can be expressed as C k = C h2 + Cê + C G1 . As noted in [15] , the Cê is much larger than the C h2 and the C G1 , and we have C k = C h2 + Cê + C G1 < 3Cê. The study [4] has shown that the computation ofê can be completed within 20 milliseconds on a Pentium III 1 GHz machine, and the computation of H 2 (ê (a · b, c) ) can be completed within 60 milliseconds, which is reasonably low and suitable for a resource-restrained mobile device.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a secure Mobile Electronic Payment (MEP) platform for the mobile commerce (m-commerce) over wireless mobile networks. In this platform, we take advantage of the emerging the ID-Based Cryptography which eliminates the necessity of certificates commonly required by other public key cryptography. Moreover, since ID-based cryptography can establish the shared key between two parties without additional message exchanges, symmetric key cryptography can be still used effectively, leading to significant computational cost. Our study shows that our MEP platform satisfies the requirements of secure trading (such as avoidance of overspending and double spending, fairness, user anonymity, and privacy) and has low computational cost. We expect that our MEP will provide a viable trading model for the future mobile applications and play an important role in the emerging m-commerce industries.
